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This research applies Kim, et al.’s (2015) supply network structure archetypes to case data 
related to two disruptions in three industries in Brazil. A total of seven supply networks were 
studied, through in-depth interviews and archival documents. The findings suggest that there 
may be additional supply network structures that are relevant. Centralization appears to be a 
function of the size of the focal firm. There was evidence of an evolution of supply network 
structures with focal firm size.  
 




Conceptualization of a set of buyer-supplier relationships as a complex network, rather than a 
chain, is a relatively recent phenomenon that mirrors real relationships. Kim, Chen and 
Linderman (2015) used graph theoretic concepts to describe four supply network structure 
archetypes, mathematically analyzing their resilience, based on the arcs and nodes impacted by 
a disruption. We apply Kim, et al.’s (2015) theoretical supply network structure archetypes to 
rich case data from seven real supply chains, in order to test their applicability. We also examine 
the resilience of each archetype, in terms of preparedness, response and recovery.  
 
Literature Review 
Structural perspective of supply network resilience 
Supply network resilience is the ability of a supply network to cope with a disruption, which 
is an unanticipated event that impacts the flow of goods (Craighead, et al., 2007). Building 
on graph theory (Diestel, 1991), a supply network is a collection of nodes (factories, 
warehouses, retailers) connected by arcs (conveyance mechanisms) (Kim, et al., 2015). An 
arc’s head indicates the direction of flow of goods. A node’s degree is the number of arcs 
attached to it, where in-degree is the number of arcs whose heads connect to it and out-degree 
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is the number whose tails connect to it. A sink node, such as a retailer, has a zero out-degree, 
but a positive in-degree, while a source node, such as a raw material supplier, has a zero in-
degree, but a positive out-degree. A walk is an alternating sequence of nodes and arcs. In a 
connected supply network, there is at least one walk between the source and sink. A supply 
network disruption can have either a local (node or arc) or global (entire network) effect, 
potentially leading to a disconnected supply network. The focus of this research is on global 
supply network disruptions.  
Kim, et al. (2015) posit that a supply network’s resilience derives from its structure. 
For example, a supply network with more nodes and arcs is more resilient. Kim, et al. (2015) 
describe four network archetypes relevant to supply networks, illustrated in Figure 1. The 
block diagonal archetype (Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2007) has clusters of nodes between the 
source and sink, with connections within clusters, but not between them. It is typical of a 
supply network for modular products, where each module supplier is responsible for design, 
manufacturing and coordinating with its own suppliers. The scale-free archetype (Barabasi 
& Albert, 1999) is characterized by a few nodes with disproportionately many connections. 
An example is a supply network where a small group of top-tier suppliers work together to 
influence supply flows from upstream members. A centralized archetype (Barabasi, 2002) 
has more highly central nodes that serve as coordinating agents that procure materials, 
allocate orders, manage subcontractors and market products. The diagonal archetype (Rivkin 
& Siggelkow, 2007) features sequential connections, where every tier receives supplies from 
its lower-tier nodes. The nodes can be partitioned into subsets that form tiers, with 
connections primarily across, rather than within, tiers. This structure is typical of the U.S. 
automotive industry, where the members of each tier directly select and manage their 
suppliers in the tier below them (Choi & Hong, 2002). 
 
 
Figure 1. Kim, et al.’s (2015) supply network archetypes 
Risk management perspective of supply network resilience 
The risk management perspective extends the supply network resilience construct beyond 
static connections between nodes. In response to a disruption, a focal firm may rearrange its 
connections and find substitute suppliers, thus it has dynamic connections to other nodes. 
Ponomarov and Holcomb (2009, p. 131) defined resilience as: “the adaptive capability of the 
supply chain to prepare for unexpected events, respond to disruptions, and recover from them 
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by maintaining continuity of operations at the desired level of connectedness and control over 
structure and function.” Supply network resilience is not a binary property, in other words, it 
exists within a continuum (Blackhurst et al., 2011). It relies on context, with the 
characteristics that make a node or supply network more or less resilient varying widely, 
depending on the situation (Pettit et al., 2010). Jüttner et al. (2003) describes risk as potential 
causes that can lead to adverse events. Mathematically, risk is defined as probability vs. 
severity (Christopher & Peck, 2004). Thus, risk in a supply network is defined as any risk to 
the flow of information, materials, products and processes, from the first supplier until the 
delivery of the final product to the final user, referring to factors that lead to a mismatch 
between supply and demand (Christopher & Peck, 2004).  
Resilience can divided into three phases (Jüttner & Maklan, 2011; Jüttner et al, 2003; 
Lindell, Prater, & Peacock, 2007; Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009), based on the risks that 
characterize them. Preparation occurs prior to a disruptive event, particularly for events that 
can be anticipated through warning signs. The initial impact may be sudden, such as with an 
earthquake or terror attack, or it may be due to gradual deterioration of conditions, such as a 
drought or recession. The higher the capacity of a supply network to anticipate a disruption, 
the more effort it will put into articulating resources and preparing itself. The flow of 
information is critical, not only for identifying imminent disruptions, but also as a warning 
to those involved. In the response stage, the need for coordination of resources begins to be 
realized, as first responders attempt to control the situation, protect lives, and prevent further 
damage. The greater a supply network’s ability to provide and coordinate resources, the faster 
it will recover and reduce the impact of the disruption (Lindell et al, 2007). The response can 
include the use of other suppliers, changing the site of the operation, searching for alternative 
modes of transportation or implementing other risk mitigation strategies. In the recovery 
phase, the supply network has passed through the worst of the disruption and the operation 
begins to return to normal. The learning process is relevant for absorbing the impact of the 
disruption and providing feedback to mitigate the impact of future disruptions. Thus, the risk 
management perspective of supply network resilience broadens the construct from Kim, et 
al.’s (2015) focus on response to include prevention and recovery. 
 
Method 
Data about two disruptions was collected in seven cases in three industries in Brazil. Each 
case comprised an end-to-end supply network. One case was the medicine supply network 
for a hospital, two were supply networks in the dermatology products industry and four were 
supply networks in the beauty products industry. Disruption 1 was an unexpectedly severe 
and rapidly spreading virus. Although the World Health Organization (WHO) and the 
Brazilian Ministry of Health had prepared for a pandemic of H5N1 virus in 2009, they were 
taken by surprise that the actual virus was H1N1, which had not previously affected humans. 
By the end of 2009, the WHO had reported over 12,220 deaths worldwide, with 2,051 in 
Brazil. This led to severe consequences in the supply chain for Oseltamivir Phosphate 
(Tamiflu), the main antiviral for treatment. Thus, this was a disruption with a severe and 
sudden impact. Disruption 2 had a more intermediate and gradual impact. It was a change in 
legislation that affected raw materials supply in the dermatology and beauty products 
industries. The Brazilian Heritage Regulatory Framework (PM2186) was a provisional 
measure established by the Brazilian federal government through its Ministry of the 
Environment. The goal was to “regulate access to the national genetic heritage, protection 
and access to associated traditional knowledge, sharing of benefits and access to technology 
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and to technology transfer for their conservation and use” (Brasil, 2001), by providing 
ecological protection to the Amazon region and the indigenous people who gather raw 
materials there. 
The unit of analysis (case) is a supply network. Seven supply networks were 
strategically selected to include both domestic and multinational focal firms, a mix of 
medium-sized and large focal firms and stable vs. rapidly changing products that correspond 
with stable vs. dynamic consumer markets. Although the ultimate consumers of their 
products vary substantially, each of these supply networks originates with agricultural 
products as the source node, and they have other nodes that interlock, to some extent.  
Case H1 is a healthcare network, with one of the main hospitals (Hosp 1) in Brazil as 
its focal firm. Hosp 1 is located in São Paulo, which is the largest city in Brazil and the most 
affected by the H1N1 pandemic. The nodes of H1 selected for study represent those that were 
most affected by risk management decisions related to H1N1. H1 is comprised of four tiers: 
(i) Hosp 1, which was responsible for the care of patients, (ii) pharmaceutical industry, which 
was responsible for providing drugs for patient care, (iii) Department of Epidemiological 
Surveillance of the Brazilian Ministry of Health, which was responsible for management of 
the National Epidemiological and Environmental Health Surveillance System, and (iv) 
Ministry of Health of São Paulo (SES)/Epidemiological Surveillance Center, which sets 
health policies, under guidelines established by the Brazilian Unified Health System (SUS). 
Cases D1 and D2 are set in the dermatology products industry. This industry provides 
over-the-counter medications for skin conditions ranging from eczema and hives to wrinkles 
and pimples. D1 is the supply network associated with Dermo 1, a medium sized domestic 
firm with about 80 franchisees. D2 is the supply network associated with Dermo 2, a 
somewhat larger domestic firm, with its own manufacturing plant and 93 retail stores. Both 
Dermo 1 and Dermo 2 started in the 1980s as compounding pharmacies, then evolved to a 
franchise model. 
Cases B1, B2, B3 and B4 are set in the beauty products industry. B1 is the supply 
network for Beauty 1, which is the Brazilian subsidiary of a large firm headquartered in 
southern France. B2 is the supply network for Beauty 2, which was formed by 14 Brazilian 
firms working together to bring French concepts and fragrances to Brazilian customers. B3 
is the supply network for Beauty 3, which is the largest Brazilian beauty products firm, as 
well as the world’s largest perfume and cosmetics franchiser, with 3,800 retail stores. B4 is 
the supply network for Beauty 4, which is the second largest domestic Brazilian cosmetics 
firm and the sixth largest direct sales firm in the world (Direct Selling News, 2015).  
Each supply network was studied end to end, with multiple interviews in each of the 
tiers. In total, we conducted 197 in-depth interviews, which were recorded, transcribed, and 
analyzed. Observations and archival documents were also used. Preliminary analysis was 
conducted using NVivo, in order to isolate primary themes. Ucinet 6.0 and Net Draw were 
used to analyze relationships among the supply network members. Kim et al.’s (2015) four 
archetype supply network structures were applied, as well as analyzing their two propositions 
in the context of our case data.  
 
Results  
Supply network archetypes 
H1 used a single linear supply chain, rather than a supply network, with only one walk 
between the source and sink. This made it highly vulnerable, since disabling any arc or node 
would disable the entire supply chain. H1’s single linear supply chain suggests that Kim et 
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al.’s (2015) set of archetypes may not be comprehensive, and that there may be other 
important supply network archetypes. 
  The dermatology products supply networks D1 and D1 were centralized, with a few 
key intermediaries. The reasons involve the size of the focal firms and characteristics of their 
suppliers. Dermo 1 and Dermo 2 are both medium size firms, ranging from 200 to 500 
employees, with their own manufacturing facilities. In contrast, the major suppliers in this 
industry are very large multinational firms, such as Dow Chemical, with thousands of 
employees globally. Because of the size discrepancies, most dermatology products firms 
purchase materials from an intermediary firm, following a centralized structure. As the focal 
firm grows, its network structure becomes more elongated, resembling the diagonal 
archetype, with less need for intermediary firms as purchase volumes increase and 
components are purchased directly from the large multinational suppliers. 
A similar evolution was observed among the beauty products supply networks. 
Beauty 2, which is a medium sized firm, is characterized by B2’s centralized supply network 
structure. B1, on the other hand, although it uses some intermediary firms, is more elongated 
and less centralized than B2, more closely resembling Kim et al (2015)’s diagonal structure. 
B3’s and B4’s network structures are best represented by a hybrid with a block-diagonal 
structure at its foundation and scale-free structures superimposed within each of its clusters. 
This is due to size and complexity of the focal firms. Beauty 3 has about 4,000 retailers, with 
22,000 employees and about 900 franchise owners. Beauty 4 has more than 6,600 direct 
employees and many thousand others through its resellers. Upstream, B3 and B4 each have 
more than 5,000 different suppliers for packaging, chemicals, and information. B3 organized 
its supply base into 42 strategic suppliers for direct supply (among about 300 possible 
suppliers), and 32 strategic suppliers for indirect supplies (among more than 5,000 possible). 
Thus, within the block diagonal archetype, scale-free supply networks are embedded. B4 
pays particular attention to 33 indigenous communities in the Amazon rain forest. 
These findings are reinforced by centrality measures calculated using Ucinet 6.0. We 
found that larger focal firms had higher levels of centrality in their supply networks. This 
supports the notion that the structure of a supply network evolves as the focal firm grows and 
plays a more important role. 
  
Impact of H1N1 pandemic 
The Oseltamivir Phosphate (Tamiflu) supply network is long and complex. The 
manufacturing process is distributed across many countries, beginning with star anise seeds 
from China, which are processed in Switzerland and the United States, among other 
locations. The total production cycle for Tamiflu is about one year, which is considered long 
by pharmaceutical industry standards. Thus, there was no ability to quickly increase 
production in the face of an unanticipated surge in demand. In addition, because drugs are 
highly regulated in Brazil, it would have been difficult to purchase Tamiflu inventories held 
in other countries. Commercially, Tamiflu is sold in the form of capsules or as a powder that 
can be reconstituted by the addition of water.  
The government had stockpiled Tamiflu between 2005 and 2006, expecting to need 
it for H5N1, which never materialized. It was purchased in powder form in 30 kg barrels, 
because of its long shelf life and lower price. The rationale was that the government’s supply 
network, which included its own laboratories, would be able to process the powder when it 
was needed by hospitals. In reality, however, this strategy was ineffective because 
government laboratories were unable to handle the sudden increases in demand. The supply 
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network was forced to develop alternative solutions for dealing with the situation. Ultimately, 
it restructured by removing all of the Tamiflu available in the drugstores, so that the 
government could centralize its distribution. It was then distributed in powder form, using 
the hospitals’ own laboratories to process the powder into the final form for administration 
to patients. 
 
Impact of environmental legislation  
Because PM 2186 was federal legislation, it affected all six of the dermatology and beauty 
products supply networks studied. It stipulated requirements for dealing with indigenous 
communities in the Amazon rain forest and other almost unreachable areas, which many 
firms felt were unreasonable, confusing and costly. Chemical products suppliers to 
dermatology and beauty products manufacturers spent millions of dollars trying to meet 
seemingly ever-changing compliance requirements. The confusion is illustrated by one of the 
focal firms which received an important award for its ecological and sustainable actions 
towards indigenous communities from the Environmental Minister, just two weeks before it 
was charged with bio-piracy through PM 2186. PM 2186 included financial penalties for 
vaguely defined noncompliance. More than $59 million in fines was levied in Operation New 
Directions, based on the argument that “Brazil’s unique species have been exploited for 
centuries by businesses, which often make fortunes while overlooking local communities 
(Erickson-Davis, 2010).” This was followed by Operation New Directions II, which levied 
even higher fines against another 35 firms (IBAMA, 2012). The list of firms fined includes 
several of the research cases, as well as well-known firms, including Ambev, Avon, Bayer, 
Eli Lilly, Pfizer, Merck, Novartis, and Unilever. PM 2186 was considered inadequate by 
scientists, and several appeals have supported the illegality of some of its components. 
B4 and B1 were the most strongly affected supply networks, with a severe financial 
and reputational impact. B1 was particularly impacted because the major reason it initiated 
business in Brazil was to capitalize on the rich biodiversity there. With the complications and 
difficulties caused by PM 2186, B1 had difficulty finding suppliers that were able to deal 
with the requirements. Its response came in the form of restructuring its supply network. 
Instead of using Amazon rain forest and Pantanal raw materials, it started using fruits and 
other materials from less regulated areas: “Even when we try very hard - and we do that - we 
cannot fulfil CEGEN’s requirements [through MP 2186], thus, instead of buying from local 
suppliers in Amazon rain forest, we are buying from local suppliers in Africa.”  In this way, 
it was able to mitigate the effect of the disruption.  
After B4 was charged with 84 different infractions during Operation New Directions, 
CEGEN’s president then overturned the charges, compounding the confusion. B3, which had 
a supply network structure similar to B4, did not experience the same impact. The reasons 
are associated with difference in the networks’ downstream strategic focus. While B4’s 
marketing appeal had always focused on nature and the ecological responsibility of its 
products, suppliers, and processes, B3 appealed to its consumers in different ways. The 
smaller supply networks (B2, D1, and D2), felt only secondary impacts of this disruption. 
For example, Dermo 1 temporarily discontinued some of its production lines because a 
supplier stopped carrying a needed Amazon rain forest raw material. It then quickly 
recovered by substituting a different raw material offered by the same supplier.  
Thus, in terms of resilience, the network structures in our real supply chains did not 
entirely support Kim et al.’s (2015) second proposition that the closer the structure follows 
the power law structure (scale-free network), the more resilient it will be. While both B3 and 
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B4 had very similar network structures that followed the power law, B3 was much more 
resilient, for reasons unrelated to its supply network structure.  
 
Discussion  
Supply Network Structure 
Most of the cases used a hybrid combination of Kim, et al.’s (2015) archetype supply network 
structures. All had a network structure based on the underlying logic of the diagonal 
archetype, with sequential connections between tiers. The nodes between the source 
(agricultural products) and the sink (hospitals for medication, estheticians and dermatologists 
for dermatology products, and retail outlets for beauty products) could be partitioned into 
subsets of nodes that formed tiers, including agricultural products, chemical suppliers, 
manufacturing, packaging, research and development, and distribution.  
We propose an extension to Kim et al.’s (2015) archetypes, based on our analysis. 
We suggest that supply network structures are not static; they evolve, following three basic 
stages: centralized, diagonal, and hybrid diagonal/scale-free. Stage I (centralized) usually 
manifests when a firm starts. Its smaller size limits its bargaining power, due to lower volume 
purchases. Thus, it buys from intermediaries, which connect it to a range of suppliers. 
Examples are found in D1, D2, and B2. Stage II (diagonal) manifests when a firm starts to 
grow. It becomes less dependent on intermediaries and its structure becomes more elongated. 
It may still use some intermediaries, however, this is more due to choice, for example because 
of a long-term relationship or better service, rather than a constraint caused by its volume. 
B1 provides an example of this structure. Stage III (hybrid diagonal/scale-free) is a block-
diagonal structure with a scale-free structure superimposed within each cluster. This stage is 
manifested in very large firms, whose supply networks are composed of thousands of 
suppliers, grouped by type of supply and strategic importance. Some centralization occurs 
within a few first tier suppliers that manage several suppliers and their suppliers. Clusters 
emerge for different types of supplies. For example, in the dermatology and beauty products 
industries, clusters include packaging, chemicals, fragrances, and information suppliers. 
Each cluster follows the power-law Pareto distribution, with very few interactions between 








These network structures affect supply network resilience, supporting Kim, et al.’s 
(2015) first proposition. We found that those that had more direct (scale-free) connections 
with their suppliers reacted more quickly to the disruption, mandating changes by their 
suppliers. On the other hand, the supply network structures that had primarily indirect 
Focal Firm Size 
Stage I: Centralized Stage II: Diagonal Stage III: Hybrid 
Diagonal/Scale-Free 
Figure 2. Proposed evolution of supply network structure 
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connections with their suppliers (centralized) were slower to react, waiting for suppliers to 
initiate changes. Thus, the recovery phase was slower for the hybrid diagonal/scale-free 
network structure. This supports Kim, et al.’s (2015) second proposition that the scale-free 
supply network structure would be most resilient. Direct links with key suppliers hastened 
the recovery phase, relative to indirect links through intermediaries in the centralized 
archetypes. 
 
Supply network resilience 
We view Kim et al.´s (2015, p.49) proposed definition of supply network resilience as "a 
network-level attribute to withstand disruptions that may be triggered at the node or arc level" 
as passive, in the sense that resilience is considered given based on network structure. Our 
results suggest that resilience may either be planned (for example, pre-designing a network 
structure to have more alternatives to deal with a potential disruption in an arc or node) or 
may emerge during a disruption. In both situations, resilience is built upon capabilities 
including risk perception, collaboration, flexibility, visibility and agility, which help a supply 
network cope with a disruption. 
  Moreover, although the literature indicates that resilience may be formed by a set of 
different capabilities, Kim et al.'s (2015) approach is related only to the flexibility capability. 
The main function of flexibility is to generate new options for a supply chain to allow its 
members to deal with disruptions, thus, flexibility plays an important role in the resilience. 
However, resilience is based on many capabilities, including redesign, change, resource 
creation, reconfiguration, prioritization, redundancy, availability and robustness, as well as 
flexibility (Bradaschia & Pereira, 2015). While resilience can be achieved by planning 
network structure, it can also be achieved by dealing with an unexpected occurrence as it 
occurs, as H1 did in its restructuring during the H1N1 pandemic. Thus, supply networks are 
dynamic, evolving over in time and in response to triggering events.  
 
Conclusions 
This study contributes to the emerging body of research on analysis of supply network 
structures in the context of resilience by applying Kim, et al.’s (2015) archetypes to rich case 
data from real supply networks. It raises the idea that the ideal archetypes may actually appear 
as hybrid networks in real supply chains, rather than in their pure form. It also supports the 
notion that the more closely a supply network follows a power-law degree distribution of 
nodes, the more resilient it will be. Thus, Kim, et al.’s (2015) mathematical analysis was 
extended by the rich case data of our qualitative analysis.  
Potential future extensions supported by this study include analysis of resilience 
within different blocks or clusters within a supply network structure. Also, in the face of a 
disruption, a supply network may restructure itself, as D1 and H1 did, to temporarily function 
with a different structure until it recovers. Our case data also suggests that supply network 
relationships go beyond simply counting arcs and nodes. In order to understand how a 
network structure affects resilience, it is important to understand both upstream and 
downstream supply networks and their power relationships. One of the major extensions that 
this study proposes to Kim et al.’s (2015) framework is the understanding that a supply 
network is not static, but rather evolves with the size of the focal firm. Thus, we propose the 
following: 
  
P1:  The centralization of a supply chain is a function of the size of a focal firm 
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P2:   As a focal firm grows, the supply chain becomes less centralized in intermediary 
firms and more centralized within itself 
P3: Supply network structures evolve from centralized to diagonal to hybrid 
diagonal/scale-free, as a focal firm grows 
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